Privatizim do tė thotė shitje e pronės pronarėve privatė.

 

 

KA ARDHUR KOHA PĖR TA VĖNĖ

NĖ DYSHIM PRIVATIZIMIN

 

 

Shkruan: Rita Augestad Knudsen ( * ) 08. 10. 2010

 

 

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     Privatizimi ėshtė njė ēėshtje thelbėsisht politike. Si njė prej shumė llojeve tė politikave ekonomike, privatizimi mund tė pėrkufizohet si transferim i pronės ose i prodhimit nga sektori publik i njė ekonomie nė pronėsi dhe shfrytėzim privat. Privatizimi ėshtė njė mėnyrė pėr t’i rregulluar marrėdhėniet pronėsore duke kaluar diēka nga kontrolli shtetėror nė kontroll privat. Nė shumicėn e demokracive elektorale kjo ēėshtje, pra niveli i rolit tė shtetit nė ekonomi dhe roli dhe madhėsia e sektorit privat, ėshtė diēka qė diskutohet ashpėrsisht. Ajo nuk ėshtė politikisht neutrale, por diēka pėr tė cilėn partitė politike zihen rreptas. Ėshtė njė ēėshtje pėr tė cilėn mendimi i dikujt varet nga simpatitė politike dhe botėkuptimi ideologjik.

     Nga viti 1999 e deri mė 2008 privatizimi, nėn administrimin zyrtar ndėrkombėtar, ishte strategjia ekonomike kryesore e Kosovės: Shtylla IV ishte pjesa e UNMIK’ut qė ishte zyrtarisht pėrgjegjėse pėr rindėrtimin dhe zhvillimin e Kosovės, dhe gjatė kėtyre nėntė vjetve privatizimi ishte aktiviteti kryesor i Shtyllės IV. Qė nė fillim tė vjeshtės nė vitin 1999 UNMIK’u kishte shprehur nė mėnyrė tė qartė synimin pėr ta bėrė privatizimin qasje kryesore tė tij ndaj ekonomisė sė Kosovės. Nė dekadėn qė pasoi burime tė mėdha u harxhuan pėr pėrgatitjen, planifikimin dhe pėr implementimin e strategjisė sė privatizimit.

     Privatizimi u zgjodh nga ana e zyrtarėve ndėrkombėtarė nė UNMIK dhe nė Shtyllėn e BE’sė si strategji kryesore ekonomike pėr Kosovėn jo pėr shkak tė karakteristikave tė posaēme tė ekonomisė sė Kosovės dhe jo pse ndonjė analizė ekonomike specifike pėr kontekstin i kishte ēuar ata nė konkluzionin se privatizimi do tė ishte mėnyra mė e mirė pėr t’i zgjidhur sfidat e veēanta ekonomike tė Kosovės. Privatizimi u zgjodh sepse UNMIK’u ishte njė operacion i ashtuquajtur "shtetndėrtues", dhe tė gjitha operacionet e tilla nė gjithė botėn realizohen brenda njė formati tė caktuar, njė modeli tė caktuar pėr reformat qė zbatohet nė tė gjitha vendet ku synohet ky objektiv. Operacionet e "shtetndėrtimit", duke pėrfshirė modelin e UNMIK’ut pėr reforma, bazohen nė argumentin se liberalizimi politik dhe ekonomik janė tė domosdoshme pėr sigurinė ndėrkombėtare. Nė fushėn ekonomike ky model liberalizimi synon, zakonisht, privatizimin dhe tregun e lirė. Dhe ishte pikėrisht kjo pse privatizimi u zgjodh pėr Kosovėn: UNMIK’u ishte njė operacion "shtetndėrtimi" - tė gjitha operacionet e kėtij lloji zbatojnė njė format tė reformave ekonomike liberale - prandaj privatizimi ishte paracaktuar pėr tė qenė qasja ndaj ekonomisė sė Kosovės pėr zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė. Ai ishte njė zgjedhje paraprakisht e vendosur.

     Privatizimi u zgjodh pėr Kosovėn pa diskutime gjithėpėrfshirėse ekonomike, pa pyetur pse dhe a ėshtė ai njė strategji e mirė pėr ekonominė, dhe pa i dhėnė askujt nga Kosova pushtet tė vėrtetė vendimor. Duke ndjekur modelin "shtetndėrtues" zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė planifikuan, pėrgatitėn dhe ekzekutuan privatizimin nė mėnyrė teknike, me njė gjuhė funksionaliste. Kjo meriton vėmendje sepse privatizimi nuk ėshtė ēėshtje teknike. Ai ėshtė njė ēėshtje politike. Ai ėshtė njė ēėshtje qė nė demokraci debatohet, analizohet dhe vihet nė pikėpyetje, dhe duhet tė jetė temė e mosmarrėveshjeve, angazhimit dhe diskutimeve politike. Por nė Kosovė kjo nuk ndodhi. Zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė zgjodhėn, pėrgatitėn dhe drejtuan privatizimin duke e hequr kėtė ēėshtje nga fusha e debatit demokratik dhe duke e vėnė nė duart e tyre - duke folur pėr tė dhe duke e avancuar si diēka teknike dhe tė padiskutueshme.

     Megjithatė, ishte njė gjė tė cilėn zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė e vunė nė pikėpyetje derisa ishin nė krye tė privatizimit nė Kosovė: si mund ta zbatonin kėtė zgjedhje tė paracaktuar tė privatizimit pa u rrezikuar qė tė mbahen pėrgjegjės pėr procesin, pa u rrezikuar nga hedhja nė gjyq? Ndėrsa formati i shtetndėrtimit i "UNMIK’ut" pėr liberalizimin ekonomik synonte privatizim tė shpejtė dhe nė shkallė tė gjerė, ishte e rėndėsishme pėr zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė qė ta bėnin kėtė nė njė mėnyrė qė nuk do tė kthehej kundėr tyre duke i bėrė ata pėrgjegjės pėr procesin.

     Ky qėllim pėr privatizim tė shpejtė dhe pa rrezik ishte komplikuar nga mjedisi i Kosovės. Historia e kohėve tė fundit e Kosovės si pjesė e Jugosllavisė socialiste, si dhe periudha e saj e represionit nėn Serbi, i ngritėn disa probleme qė e bėnin privatizimin njė ēėshtje ligjėrisht shumė tė rrezikshme pėr zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė, mė shumė se qė kishin paramenduar. Njė ēėshtje e rėndėsishme lidhej me pronėsinė ligjore tė ndėrmarrjeve nė Kosovė. Privatizimi do tė thotė shitje e pronės pronarėve privatė, por nė Kosovė zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė nuk ishin tė sigurt se kush ishte pronari i pronės qė do tė shitej. Pa krijuar njė kornize ligjore pėr privatizimin qė do ta sqaronte kėtė, ose tė paktėn do t’i mbronte zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė nga ankesat rreth pronėsisė, ata nuk guxonin t’ia fillonin me procesin.

     Shqetėsimi tjetėr i zyrtarėve ndėrkombėtarė kishte tė bėnte me frikėn e tyre se mund tė akuzoheshin se po kapėrcenin mandatin e tyre gjatė privatizimit: ata nuk ndiheshin plotėsisht tė sigurt pėr lirinė e veprimit tė autoritetit ligjor tė UNMIK’ut nė fushėn e tė drejtave pronėsore. UNMIK’u kishte mandatin pėr tė administruar pronėn nė Kosovė, por kjo nuk do tė thotė se kishte tė drejtėn pėr ta shitur.

     Me pak fjalė, Shtylla IV ishte pėrgjegjėse pėr rindėrtim dhe zhvillim ekonomik, dhe privatizimi ishte aktiviteti kryesor i Shtyllės IV nė Kosovė, nuk ishin konsideratat ekonomike ato qė i dhanė formėn privatizimit tė drejtuar nga ndėrkombėtarėt nė Kosovė. Nė vend tė kėsaj, ajo qė dominoi tek zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė qė kishin marrė pėrsipėr ekonominė e Kosovės ishin konsideratat ligjore: si tė kryhej privatizimi pa u mbajtur ligjėrisht pėrgjegjės pėr procesin. Ky ishte njė shqetėsim i madh nė mesin e zyrtarėve ndėrkombėtarė, sepse ata besonin se rreziku pėr t'u paditur nė gjyq gjatė privatizimit nė Kosovė ishte mjaft i madh.

     Frika e madhe e zyrtarėve ndėrkombėtarė pėr pėrgjegjėsinė e tyre u manifestua nė kornizėn ligjore dhe operative tė procesit tė privatizimit nė Kosovė. Ndėrsa privatizimi - njė ēėshtje krejtėsisht politike - u depolitizua dhe u shndėrrua nė ēėshtje teknike nga zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė nė Kosovė - kuadri ligjor i privatizimit u politizua: krejt qėllimi i ligjeve tė UNMIK’ut tė hartuara pėr privatizimin nė Kosovė ishte kryerja e procesit (nė pėrputhje me formatin e paracaktuar tė "shtetndėrtimit", dhe pavarėsisht nga tė gjitha problemet e mėdha qė zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė i shihnin nė lidhje me tė) pa i ekspozuar zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė ndaj rrezikut ligjor.

     Diskutimet ligjore mbi privatizimin nė Kosovė, si dhe zgjidhjet e bėra pėr procesin, u dominuan plotėsisht nga zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė, ndėrsa pikėpamjet dhe tė drejtat e vendėsve nuk u konsideruan tė rėndėsishme. Zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė ishin tė shqetėsuar pėr pasojat e privatizimit pėr regjistrat ligjorė personalė, por nuk u ndalėn pėr tė ndėrmarrė njė shqyrtim tė plotė tė pasojave ekonomike tė privatizimit pėr njerėzit nė Kosovė. Njė vlerėsim i tillė ende nuk ėshtė bėrė, dhe, pėr rrjedhim, pasojat e sakta ekonomike tė privatizimit mbeten tė papėrcaktuara deri nė kėtė ditė. Ndėrkaq, ajo qė ėshtė e qartė pas njė dekade privatizimi si qasje kryesore e operacionit gjigant tė “shtetndėrtimit” ndaj ekonomisė sė Kosovės ėshtė se rreth gjysma e popullsisė ėshtė ende pa punė, rreth gjysma e saj jeton nė varfėri, dhe sistemet e shėndetėsisė, arsimit, infrastruktura, prodhimi vendor dhe bujqėsia janė shumė shumė tė dobėta. Edhe sipas vetė qėllimit zyrtar tė Shtyllės IV pėr rindėrtim dhe zhvillim privatizimi nuk duket se ka funksionuar.

     Zyrtarėt ndėrkombėtarė nuk ishin tė interesuar tė diskutojnė pse apo a duhet tė bėhet privatizimi nė Kosovė. Por Kosova ka arsye tė mirė pėr tė pyetur pse procesi ishte zgjedhur qė nė fillim, si ka ndikuar ai vėrtet nė gjendjen socio-ekonomike, dhe pse privatizimi po vazhdon.

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    * ) Rita Augestad Knudsen ėshtė autore e “The Comprehensive UN Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia: Aims, Impact and Legacy (NUPI/Kolofon 2008)”,  dhe autore e  raportit "Privatizimi nė Kosovė: Projekti ndėrkombėtar 1999-2008" (NUPI 2010). Ajo, aktualisht ėshtė duke e bėrė doktoraturėn nė Historinė Ndėrkombėtare nė Londėr School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)

 

 

 

It’s about time to question privatisation in Kosovo

( Rita Augestad Knudsen )

 

     Privatisation is a fundamentally political issue. As one of many types of economic policies, privatisation can be defined as the transfer of property or production from the public sector of an economy to private ownership and operation. Privatisation is a way of regulating property relations by changing something from state to private control. In most electoral democracies, this issue – the level of the state’s role in the economy and the role and scope of the private sector – is hotly disputed. It is not politically neutral, but something political parties fight bitterly over. It is an issue on which one’s opinion is decided by political sympathies and ideological outlook.

     From 1999 to 2008, privatisation under formal international leadership was Kosovo’s main economic strategy: Pillar IV was the part of UNMIK formally responsible for Kosovo’s reconstruction and development, and during these nine years privatisation was the main activity of Pillar IV. Already in early autumn 1999, UNMIK had expressed clearly that it aimed to let privatisation be its main approach to Kosovo’s economy. For the next decade to come, enormous resources were spent on preparing, planning and implementing the privatisation strategy.

     Privatisation was chosen by international officials in UNMIK and the EU Pillar as Kosovo’s main economic strategy not because of the exact characteristics of Kosovo’s economy, and not because a context-specific economic analysis had led them to the conclusion that privatisation would be the best way to handle Kosovo’s special economic challenges. Privatisation was chosen because UNMIK was a so-called “statebuilding” operation, and all such operations throughout the world function with a certain template, a certain model for reform, which it implements in all targets. “Statebuilding” operations’, including UNMIK’s, model for reform is based on the argument that political and economic liberalisation are necessary for international security. On the economic field, this liberalisation model call for, typically, privatisation and free trade. And this was why privatisation was chosen for Kosovo: UNMIK was a “statebuilding” operation - all operations of this kind implement a template of liberal economic reform - so privatisation was predetermined to be the approach to Kosovo’s economy for international officials. It was a preset choice.

     Privatisation was chosen for Kosovo without comprehensive economic discussion on why or whether this was the best strategy for the economy, and without giving anyone from Kosovo real decision-making power. While following the “statebuilding” model, international officials planned, prepared and executed privatisation in a technical way, with a functionalistic language. This is interesting – because privatisation is not a technical issue. It is a political issue. It is an issue which in democracies are, and should be, vigorously debated, analysed and questioned – the subject of disagreement, political engagement and disputes. But in Kosovo, it was not. International officials chose, prepared and led privatisation by removing the issue from the field of democratic debate and into their own hands talking about it, and advancing it as something technical and unquestionable.

     It was one thing, though, that international officials did question while they were in charge of privatisation in Kosovo: how could they implement this ready set choice of privatisation without risking to be held accountable for the process, without risking to be sued? While UNMIK’s “statebuilding” template for economic liberalisation called for quick and large-scale privatisation, it was important for international officials to do this in a way that would not backfire by making them responsible for the process.

     This aim of speedy and risk-free privatisation was complicated by the Kosovo environment. Kosovo’s recent history as part of socialist Yugoslavia, as well as its period of repression under Serbia, brought up issues making privatisation far from legally risk-free for international officials. An important issue regarded legal ownership of enterprises in Kosovo. Privatisation means selling property to private owners, but in Kosovo, international officials were unsure who owned the property that would be sold. Without establishing a legal framework for privatisation that would either clarify this, or at least protect international officials from claims related to ownership, they did not dare to start with the process.

     Another concern related to international officials’ fear of being accused for overstepping their mandate when privatising: they did not feel completely confident on the scope of UNMIK’s legal authority on the field of property rights. UNMIK’s mandate expressed that it should administer property in Kosovo, but that did not mean it had the right to sell it.

     In short, although Pillar IV was responsible for economic reconstruction and development, and privatisation was Pillar IV’s main activity in Kosovo, it was not primarily economic considerations that shaped internationally led privatisation in Kosovo. Instead, what dominated international officials in charge of Kosovo’s economy were legal considerations: how to privatise without being held legally responsible for the process. This was a great concern among international officials, because they believed the risk of being sued when privatising in Kosovo was considerable.

     International officials great fear of accountability was manifested in the legal and operational framework of the privatisation process in Kosovo. While privatisation – a fundamentally political issue - was depoliticised and technicalised by international officials in Kosovo - the legal framework of privatisation became politicised: the whole purpose of the UNMIK-created laws for privatisation in Kosovo was to carry out the process (in line with the predetermined “statebuilding” template, and despite all the great problems international officials associated with it) without exposing international officials to legal risk.

     The legal debates on privatisation in Kosovo as well as the solutions chosen for the process were dominated completely by international officials, while local views and rights were not considered important. International officials were worried about the consequences of privatisation for their own legal records-but did not pause to undertake a comprehensive review of the economic consequences of privatisation for people in Kosovo. Such a review has still not been undertaken, and therefore the exact economic consequences of privatisation remain undetermined until this day. Meanwhile, what is clear is that after a decade of privatisation as a huge “statebuilding” operation’s main approach to Kosovo’s economy, around half of the population is still without work, around half lives in poverty and Kosovo’s systems of health, education, infrastructure, local production and agriculture are very very weak. Even according to Pillar IV’s own formal aim of reconstruction and development, privatisation does not seem to have worked.

     International officials were never interested in discussing the question of why or whether to privatise in Kosovo. But Kosovo has good reason to question why the process was chosen in the first place, how it really has affected the socioeconomic situation, and why privatisation is continuing.

 

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( Moderatori i pashtriku.org - 08. 10. 2010 )